SUMMARY
Sierra Leone’s relative peace came at a bitter price for the Nigerian Armed Forces and the country’s fragile economy. Nigeria was virtually the only country in Sierra Leone since ECOWAS member States did not appear too enthusiastic about committing troops to keep the peace after the restoration of Kabbah back to power. Despite its misgivings about the Abacha regime, the U.N. response and that of the international community in general had been more positive than it had been in Liberia, but like Liberia, the response came late, and came amidst fears of Nigeria’s decision to pull out its troops. Abacha’s real motives for restoring democracy to Sierra Leone when he was suppressing it at home are not too clear. However, in this case, Nigeria’s initial actions were more unilateral than it had been in Liberia. This was a reflection of the desire of Nigeria to score a quick victory without other ECOMOG components, but it failed woefully. In other words, the Nigerian Armed Forces were the ones that had to bear the brunt of the regime’s relations abroad.
The restoration of constitutional governments in Sierra Leone will mark the end of the active deployment of ECOMOG. In accordance with the framework under which the force operates, the contingents return to their respective countries. ECOMOG has achieved a great deal of success and has provided evidence of what is possible if African states unite to address a problem.
The ECOMOG experience demonstrates the necessity to go beyond traditional peacekeeping narratives to new and broader fields of investigation, in particular in understanding how involvement in peacekeeping influences political processes in those states which are themselves engaged in these operations.
ECOMOG operations also demonstrate the difficulties and pitfalls of such regional peacekeeping. In a geographically fissured region like West Africa, regionalism proved to be a problematic vehicle for intervention. While regional self-interest made ECOWAS to stay in the operation, factional frictions within the organization (exploited in turn by warlords) forced a prolongation of the conflict.
On the other hand, many of the challenges faced by ECOMOG were also inherent in the very nature of post-cold war conflicts and peacekeeping.
The deep-seated causes of these conflicts, and the lack of overwhelming military advantage on the part of governments and intervention forces, make for protracted violence, and call for political commitment as well as open-endedness in the intervention agenda (e.g. ECOMOG peacekeepers were first deployed in an intervention expected to last between six to twelve months, and ended up with an involvement that lasted eight years).
Before the Sierra Leone crisis, Nigeria had intervened under similar circumstances In Liberia between 1990 and 1996. Though the Sierra Leone conflict started in 1991, it was to a large extent an extension of the Liberian crisis. Both countries are contiguous neighbours in the Mano River region. In other words, had there not been a Liberian conflict there would have been no conflict in the neighbouring state of Sierra Leone and certainly there would have been no need for a Nigerian led ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone. But there was a spill-over of the Liberian conflict into Sierra Leone. At the same time, the largely Nigerian led Forces found themselves bearing the burden of Nigeria’s foreign policy in the West African sub region.
